Word: wars
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Dates: during 1970-1979
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...would not be able to use our differences with Saigon to jockey us at the last moment into doing what we had refused for four years: overthrowing the political structure in South 'Viet Nam. "In any case, Kissinger goes on, "Thieu's reaction guaranteed that the war would not end soon." Kissinger was barely back in Washington when the North Vietnamese, hoping to force Nixon's hand, went public. They broadcast the terms of the proposed treaty, which had been kept secret until then, and accused the U.S. of stalling on its implementation...
...bring Hanoi back to the conference table. Nixon accepted Haig's view. I went along with it-at first with slight reluctance, later with conviction. For Nixon and Haig were, I still believe, essentially right. We had only two choices: taking a massive, shocking step to end the war quickly, or letting matters drift...
...more unjustly treated. It was not a barbarous act of revenge. It did not cause exorbitant casualties by Hanoi's own figures; certainly it cost much less than the continuation of the war, which was the alternative. A decade of frustration with Viet Nam, a generation of hostility to Nixon, and-let me be frank-exasperation over his electoral triumph, coalesced to produce a unanimity of editorial outrage that suppressed all judgment in an emotional orgy. Nixon chose the only weapon he had available. His decision speeded the end of the war; I can think of no other measure...
...negotiated), there remained primarily the theological issue of how to sign the documents so that Saigon did not have to acknowledge the Communist-front Provisional Revolutionary Government. We devised a formula according to which neither Saigon nor the P.R.G. was mentioned in the document; the agreement to end the war in Viet Nam has the distinction of being the only document with which I am familiar in diplomatic history that does mention the main parties. The negotiations had begun in 1968 with a haggle over the shape of the table; they ended in 1973 with a haggle in effect over...
...political future. The DMZ would be respected. The U.S. would pledge to aid in reconstruction efforts.] The agreement reflected a true equilibrium of forces on the ground. If the equilibrium were maintained, the agreement could have been maintained. We believed Saigon was strong enough to deal with guerrilla war and low-level violations. The implicit threat of our retaliation would be likely to deter massive violations. We had no illusions about Hanoi's long-term goals. Nor did we go through the agony of four years of war and searing negotiations simply to achieve a "decent interval...